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Universal Hospital Insurance and Health
Care Reform: Policy Legacies and Path
Dependency in the Development of Canada's
Health Care System
LESLEY A. JACOBSt

In both Canada and the United States, reform of the
existing health care systems by policy makers has proven to
be extraordinarily difficult. The pattern of public health
care reform initiatives in Canada is one of high
expectations and a concerted effort followed by little in
terms of genuine change or progress.1 Explanations for this
pattern have tended to focus on the political dynamics
necessary to bring about effective change in social policy. In
particular, two institutions have figured in the most
influential accounts of why the existing Canadian health
care system is so resilient. One is the distinctive institution
of Canadian federalism. Genuine pan-Canadian health care
reform requires the fiscal involvement of the federal
government, but also requires the provincial governments
to implement it. This is because, in the 1867 British North
America Act, which defined the constitutional division of
powers between the provincial governments and the federal
government, health care was assigned principally to the
provinces even though the federal government has greater
scope for raising revenue. This has meant that in order for
the federal government to initiate health care reform, it
must do so with the cooperation of the provinces. And in
practice that cooperation has proven to be very difficult to
sustain in recent years because the provinces have a proven
track record of not keeping their promises when accepting

t Associate Professor, Law & Society Program, Faculty of Arts/Graduate
Program in Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada. Email: jacobs@yorku.ca
1. A description of this pattern over the past ten years can be found in the
introduction to my forthcoming book, LESLEY A. JACOBS, CANADIAN HEALTH
CARE POLICY REFORM: VALUES, RIGHTS, LAw (forthcoming 2006).
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new federal money. 2 The other institution that has featured
prominently in accounts of why the Canadian health care
system is so stable and difficult to change is the distinctive
arrangement within that system between the provincial
governments that are the payers for the system and the
physicians who deliver health care within the system on a
this institutional
basis. 3 In effect,
fee-for-service
arrangement has preserved the autonomy of physicians to
make professional judgments about the care of their
patients whilst at the same time provided for a single payer
public scheme where ability to pay has ceased to be an issue
for medically necessary services. Since many health care
reforms such as primary care reform and capitation
payment schemes have entailed changes to this
arrangement, they have been resisted in a collective
manner by physicians.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the
institutional place of hospital insurance in the development
of the Canadian health care system is another very
important factor, albeit neglected, in the puzzle about
health care reform. Hospitals were in the late 1950s the
first site for publicly funded national health care. The
federal government put in place through legislation a costsharing funding mechanism for universally accessible
hospital care and diagnostic services to be implemented and
administered by provincial health care systems. 4 A parallel
scheme for physician services did not follow for more than a
decade. 5 What I argue below is that this initial policy
development - the first major step towards a federally
funded universally accessible health care system in Canada
- has created a policy legacy that constrains health care
reform initiatives today, and that successful Canadian
health care reform must adapt to these constraints through
2. For a very recent overview, see Mary Janigan, A National Disgrace: The
Provinces are Taking $18 billion for Health Care - and not Keeping Their
Promises,MACLEAN'S, Jan. 24, 2005, at 16.
3. For the best accounts, see C. DAVID NAYLOR, PRIVATE PRACTICE, PUBLIC
PAYMENT: CANADIAN MEDICINE AND THE POLITICS OF HEALTH INSURANCE (1986)
and CAROLYN HUGHES TUOHY, ACCIDENTAL LOGICS: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN
THE HEALTH CARE ARENA IN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND CANADA (1999).

4. See Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act, R.S.C., ch. 28, § 1
(1957) (Can.).
5. See Medical Care Act, R.S.C., ch. 64, § 1 (1966) (Can.).
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a number of distinctive institutional strategies. For the
sake of simplicity, I have simply assumed that it makes
sense to refer to a national health care system in Canada as opposed to thirteen entirely separate and very different
provincial and territorial health care systems-and used
the case of health care in the largest province, Ontario, to
illustrate this argument.
My claim that the targeting of one class of medical
services - hospital services - for universal access fifty years
ago still shapes health care reform in Canada today
parallels (albeit with a twist) one now made about health
care reform in the United States. In the United States, the
initial major steps towards publicly funded health care
were targeted at residual populations - the elderly and the
indigent - which resulted in Medicare and Medicaid during
the Johnson administration. While at the time many
believed that this constituted a step towards universal
access, it has in recent years become clearer that in fact this
targeting has made reform directed at universal access
harder to achieve, not easier.6 There are at least three
important reasons for this. 7 The first is that by targeting
those in the general population who consume the most
health care resources, this has raised almost from the
outset the question of whether public funded universal
access to health care for all Americans is affordable. The
second reason is that the absence of a publicly funded
health care program for the vast majority of middle-class
Americans has been inevitably filled by private insurance
schemes that set a higher standard for any publicly funded
program to match than the threshold that existed in the
1950s before the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid.
The third reason is that these developments galvanized the
strength and influence of the private health care industry,
which are now able to block reforms that do not serve their
best interests.

6. See TED MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE 173-75 (2d ed. 2000).
7. See Jacob Hacker, The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance:
Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S.
Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEL. 57, 118-19 (1998).
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LEGACY AND PATH DEPENDENCY IN POLICY DEVELOPMENT

The theoretical framework for this paper is provided by
the twin ideas of policy legacies and path dependency.
These ideas stem from the emergence of so-called "new
institutionalism" in the social sciences, especially political
science and economics. 8 The main insight underlying the
ideas of policy legacies and path dependency is that policy
decisions made earlier in the development of a public policy
such as health care have a strong impact on the options and
incentives to consider other alternatives available to
contemporary policy makers. In other words, once you have
gone down one path, it becomes increasingly difficult to
change to another one. Like with so many other realms of
our lives, public policy making over time involves
appreciating that going through certain doors entails
closing off other doors that had been open in the past. Each
fork in the path does not provide the opportunity to revisit
the entire path we have followed. Instead, earlier policy
decisions offer a legacy that shapes the present including
the alternatives available to us. 9
Any path dependency analysis of public policy
development focuses on institutions, for it is institutions
that endure over time and are the on-going legacies of
earlier policy decisions. In other words, it is institutions
that provide the bounds of the path of Canadian health care
policy. The institutions in question vary greatly in their
structure and essence. At its most abstract, an institution
can be understood as a set of rules that govern behavior in
a particular context. 10 Consider for example a game of

8. For an overview, see Peter Hall & Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and
the Three New Institutionalisms,44 POL. STUD. 936 (1996).
9. See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL

ANALYSIS 17-53 (2004).
10. This definition of institutions and the contrast to organizations has its
origins in institutional economics, especially the work of Douglas North. See
DOUGLAS

C. NORTH,

INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL

CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). A different way to draw this distinction is between
institutions and offices where, for example, the president or the prime minister
is understood as an office. For instance, Karen Orren draws the distinction in
this way in the context of the development of American constitutional law. See
Karen Orren, Officers' Rights: Toward a Unified Field Theory of American
ConstitutionalDevelopment, 34 L. & SOC'Y REV. 873 (2000). For the purposes of
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chess. The familiar rules of chess such as castling or en
passant are an institution. In contrast, the World Chess
Federation, high school chess clubs as well as neighborhood
associations are best thought of as organizations. Similarly,
in Canadian health care reform, organizations involved
include political offices such as the provincial premiers and
territorial leaders, the prime minister, health ministers,
ministries of health, health care professions and their
hospitals
groups,
patients
associations,
respective
associations, unions, and so on. The institutions that govern
Canadian health care reform, on the other hand, include
federal and provincial legislation, scheduled meetings of the
provincial premiers and the prime minister, principles and
values, the opportunities for judicial review of health care
policy, the sources of public revenue, and so on. Institutions
care policy,
for health
create the opportunities
organizations function "to take advantage of those
opportunities."" Because organizations are not only subject
to institutions but very often are the authors of the rules
that constitute institutions, this distinction between the
organizations and institutions can in practice be difficult to
make precisely. 12 However, the belief that there is such a
distinction is a reasonable one and can be shown to be
fruitful for understanding Canadian health care reform. In
particular, the institutions, as opposed to the organizations,
of Canadian health care reform provide the key to
explaining its development. My assumption is that
institutions and policies function in a similar way to the
extent that they structure the strategies of agents and
organizations. 13
Of course, the view that institutions matter to health
care reform in Canada and elsewhere is not an especially
insightful one. Indeed, most reform initiatives have held
that the key to successful health care reform is new
health care reform, however, the idea of an organization better captures the
diverse nature of the players involved than the idea of an office.
11. NORTH, supra note 10, at 7.
12. See YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE 14 (2002).
13. See Paul Pierson, Introduction: Investigating the Welfare State at
Century's End, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 1, 8 (Paul Pierson
ed., 2001); Stewart Wood, Labour Market Regimes Under Threat? Sources of
Continuity in Germany, Britain, and Sweden, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE
WELFARE STATE 377 supra, at 367, 377.
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institutions. My point is not, however, that the right new
institutions matter for health care reform but rather that
institutions matter because existing institutions constrain
health care reform initiatives including efforts to build new
institutions.
The present paper identifies two very different ways
that the sequential development of existing institutions
constrain health care reform in Canada. One way is
through what I call an institutional settlement. An
institutional settlement occurs when a certain practice or
policy is set in place and persists over time even though the
rationale for the policy or practice evolves and changes.
Institutional settlements illustrate both, on the one hand,
how institutions develop and evolve and, on the other hand,
how they stay the same. Although Kathleen Thelen doesn't
use the precise language of institutional settlements, a
clear illustration of an institutional settlement is provided
in her recent book, How Institutions Evolve: The Political
Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States,
and Japan.14 Germany differs from the United States and
Britain because it has an elaborate private firm-sponsored
training and apprenticeship system in its industrial sector.
This vocational training system has persisted in Germany
since the late nineteenth century, despite two world wars
and many major political upheavals and breakpoints.
Although it was originally introduced to weaken industrial
unions in Germany, firm-based training and apprenticeship
is now strongly defended on the grounds that it strengthens
these unions. What has shifted, in other words, is the
rational for the institutional settlement. Yet, it doesn't
follow that an institutional settlement such as Germany's
vocational training system has not developed and evolved;
there is, however, a certain essence of the system-the
primary role of the firm in the training-that has continued
since its inception more than a century ago.
Similarly, I argue below that the 1957 Hospital
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act gave birth to an
institutional settlement excluding extra billing and user
fees for patients utilizing publicly funded medically

14. See KATHLEEN THELEN, How INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SKILLS IN GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN 30-34

(2004).
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necessary hospital and physician services in Canada. The
essence of this institutional settlement-the exclusion of
extra billing and user fees-has persisted now for more
than fifty years, even though the rationale for that
institutional settlement has shifted. In the same way that
the institutional settlement around vocational training in
Germany has constrained reform of its labor skills market,
likewise the institutional settlement against extra billing
and user fees sets boundaries on health care reform in
Canada today.
The second way that existing institutions constrain
health care reform is through positive feedback
mechanisms. Positive feedback occurs when an existing
state of affairs is self-reinforcing in the sense that it is
difficult or costly to change the status quo and switch to
another state of affairs. The claim that many institutions
rely on positive feedback mechanisms is central to the ideas
of path dependency and policy legacies. Paul Pierson
explains the logic of positive feedback in the following way:
"Each step along a particular path produces consequences
that increase the relative attractiveness of that path for the
next round. As such effects begin to accumulate,15 they
generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity."
Positive feedback mechanisms outside of health care
institutions building their effects over time are a familiar
part of everyday life. They are, for example, a common
feature of products in the insurance industry such as
household insurance. Most insurers provide a renewal
discount where your premium is reduced by say 10% for
each year that you stay with the insurer. The logic is that
when selecting a company for your household insurance
each year, the inclination is to stay with your current
insurer because you lose the renewal discount if you switch
to a new carrier. In effect, the decision you made last year
about which insurance carrier to use has a legacy impact on
your decision this year and in this sense constrains your
decision-making options.
Often, the impact of institutional positive feedback on
decisions in our personal lives is not measurable simply in
terms of money. Suppose for example that as a parent I am
unhappy with the neighborhood public school where my
15. PIERSON, supra note 9, at 17-18.
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children have gone for the past five years and am
considering switching them to another public school in the
neighborhood. Most of us are aware in these sorts of
situations that even if there may be educational benefits of
switching
schools,
there
are
positive
feedback
considerations at play that favor staying put such as the
children's network of friends and knowledge of the school's
community of teachers and parents. Moreover, these
positive feedback considerations build over time. The longer
your children have been attending the school, the more
difficult it is to switch.
Positive feedback dynamics are noteworthy for two
reasons. 16 One is that it explains why the costs of a
dramatic policy change-a policy reversal or path changeoften increase over time. It is easier to transfer law schools
when you have only been there a year then when you are in
your final year. The other is that it explains why issues of
timing and sequencing in policy implementation is so
important. What comes first can significantly impact what
can feasibly follow.
The anecdotal evidence that the positive feedback of
existing institutional arrangements impacts health care
reform is, I believe, overwhelming, once these mechanisms
are looked for in the Canadian health care system. I show
below how the development in the 1950s of a hospitalcentered publicly funded health care system put in place a
positive feedback mechanism that self-reinforces the
perpetuation of this hospital-centered system. In effect, this
institutional arrangement relies on a positive feedback
dynamic even though it is doubtful that it was originally
designed to do so. This account explains why in the name of
reform, Canadian policy makers cannot simply discard
existing institutions that constrain reform and replace
them with new institutions that better meet the health care
needs and priorities of Canadians in the twenty-first
century. It may seem puzzling why, for instance, if the overemphasis on hospitals is in tension with the new priority of
homecare, the provinces don't simply reduce funding to
hospitals and divert the funds to homecare. The answer
rests, I think, on the prevalence of positive feedback
mechanisms. Existing health care institutions matter then

16. See id. at 18.
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not simply because they have a hard time adjusting to the
new health care needs and priorities of Canadians or
because they reflect an institutional settlement but also
because they invoke positive feedback mechanisms that
constitute headwinds to genuine change and reform.
Moreover, as Medicare grows older, the effects of positive
feedback build over time, thereby making far-reaching
reform more and more difficult. Hence, it was far easier for
the federal government to reform Medicare in 1971 and
1984 then in 2004.
UNIVERSAL PUBLICLY FUNDED HOSPITAL INSURANCE

Although some provinces entered into the field of
publicly funded health care services delivered by hospitals
to some degree in the 1930s, 17 the Canadian federal
government's involvement with hospital provision did not
begin in any systematic way until the late 1940s. In 1948,
the federal government initiated the National Health
Grants Program which provided each province with grants
for public health measures, mental health and hospital
construction. Hospital construction constituted the largest
part of the program, amounting to nearly half of the funds
initially allocated to the program.18 The hospital
construction grants provided a pioneer model for costsharing in health care because they required that
contributions by the federal government be matched by the
provincial government where the hospital construction was
taking place. Underlying the hospital construction grants
scheme was a belief, similar to one that unified supporters
of the 1946 Hill-Burton Act in the United States,' 9 that
hospitals were the best vehicles for disseminating the
benefits of progress in medicine in Canada.
The hospital construction grants from the federal
government impacted the Canadian health care system
after WWII in four major ways. First of all, the grants

17. See C. STUART HOUSTON, STEPS ON THE
SASKATCHEWAN LED THE WAY 8-40 (2002).
18. See MALCOLM

G.

TAYLOR,

ROAD TO MEDICARE:

INSURING NATIONAL

HEALTH

WHY

CARE: THE

CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 81 (The Univ. of N.C. Press 1990) (1978).
19. See DANIEL M. Fox, HEALTH POLICIES, HEALTH POLITICS: THE BRITISH AND
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1911-1965, at 123 (1986).
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facilitated the dramatic expansion of the capacity of
hospitals to provide medical services. In the period from
1948 to 1970 when the grants ended, federal funds were
used to generate 130,000 hospital beds. 20 This meant that
80% of the total hospital beds in 1970 in Canada had been
funded by the program. 21 The grants also expanded
dramatically hospital laboratories, community health
centers, teaching facilities, emergency wards, and
diagnostic areas. Second, the program led to the extensive
building of hospitals in rural areas and small towns across
Canada. Third, because the hospitals were new and
designed to take advantage of progress in medical
technology and innovation, they increased the cost of
hospital services for individual patients. Fourth, because
the matching construction grants were restricted to socalled voluntary hospitals, for-profit private sector hospitals
were not able to gain a foothold in the Canadian health care
system. Voluntary hospitals are non-profit firms governed
by a board of trustees representing the legal owners who
are a voluntary society, university, municipality, or
religious order. 22 For-profit hospitals are still virtually nonexistent in Canada.
The expanded capacity for hospitalization combined
with the increased cost per bed meant that in the 1950s
there was an increase in pressure to develop some sort of
public insurance. 23 In the 1950s, provincial medical
20. See Maurice LeClair, The Canadian Health Care System, in NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE: CAN WE LEARN FROM CANADA? 14 (Spyros Andreopoulos ed.,
1975).

21. This is my calculation based on the fact that there were 150,000 hospital
beds in 1974. See id.
22. See ROBERT G. EVANS, STRAINED MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN
HEALTH CARE 160 (1984).

23. Ironically, the then Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent had defended
extending the capacity for hospitalization as precisely a precursor to publicly
funded hospital insurance, stating in 1952:
I do not feel that the government has the right to give Canadians
contractual rights to hospital treatment until there is sufficient
accommodation in the hospitals to enable the government to fulfill that
obligation . . . I do not feel sure there is sufficient hospital space to
enable all that would have contractual rights to receive hospital
treatment.
quoted in MALCOLM G. TAYLOR,

POLICY 183 (1978).

HEALTH INSURANCE AND CANADIAN PUBLIC
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associations developed extensive prepayment plans for
physician services. Combined with the prepayment plans
offered through Blue Cross and commercial insurance, in
Ontario in 1954, 45% of residents had some form of
coverage. 24 Physicians relied, however, on insurance
payments for only 28.5% of their revenue. 25 In Ontario, at
the same time about 67% had some measure of Blue Cross
or commercial hospital insurance. 26 Hospitals in turn were
much more dependent on insurance payments for their
revenue, which amounted to 46% of all revenue in 1954.27
Hospitals were in this respect more dependent on third
party insurance payers for revenue. This should not be
surprising because the increased cost of hospitalization
made the ability to pay of individual patients a much
greater factor.
This reliance of hospitals on insurance payments raised
three distinct issues. The first concerned other revenue
sources for hospitals. The hospitals in Ontario also relied
for revenue on direct payments by patients (25.1%),
charitable donations (3.5%), and a variety of government
sources including the provincial government (9.7%),
Workmen's compensation (3.9%), federal funds (1.4%), and
municipal governments (9%).28 In effect, this meant that
hospitals relied for a quarter of their income on a
patchwork of government schemes. The second issue
concerned the efficiency of relying on an insurance
mechanism. Influential research findings showed at the
time that relying on an insurance mechanism added 16% to
the cost of providing the coverage, in effect, increasing
hospital costs by 8%.29 The final issue was that in rural
areas and small towns, insurance payments were less than
in bigger urban centers. This meant that the numerous new
hospitals built with the funds provided by the federal
government's hospital construction matching grants in
24.
(1957).

See

MACOLM

G.

TAYLOR, FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE 54

25. See id. at 53-54.
26. See id. at 49.
27. See id. at 48-49.
28. See id. at 43.
29. See id. at 47. My calculation is based on insurance payments amounting
to roughly half of the total revenues of Ontario's hospitals.
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rural areas and small towns faced an especially serious
revenue problem. In other words, although these new
hospitals had been built after 1948 principally with public
30
money, there were not adequate funds to operate them.
In 1957, the federal government entered the field of
health care delivery with the enactment of the Hospital
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act. This bill was
introduced by and shepherded through the federal
parliament by the then Minister of National Health and
Welfare Paul Martin (the father of the current Prime
Minister Paul Martin). The bill provided for the federal
government to begin contributing financially to the
operation of institutional health care in general hospitals
and related hospitals including diagnostic (laboratory and
radiological) services. The provision was in other words for
the federal government to underwrite some of the costs of
provincially administered hospital care. The act did not
involve any change in the legal ownership of hospitals.
Moreover, because it did not have any serious implications
for the payment structure of physicians with hospital
privileges or salaried staff physicians, it was not opposed by
viewed as an
the medical associations in Canada and widely
31
effective way to stabilize hospital funding.
THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT AGAINST EXTRA BILLING

At present, Canada's health care system is unique in
the world because it does not allow for private payment for
medically necessary hospital and physician care. All such
medically necessary care is publicly funded (although the
precise definition of what constitutes medically necessary is
a term of art that differs from province to province.) This
means, for example, that more than 90% of hospital
revenue comes from public funds. The other 10% comes
from charges for non-medically necessary services such as
private or semi-private rooms. In 2004, $35,814,000 of
public funds were spent on hospital care compared to only
$3,082,700,000 from private sources. 32 Patients cannot

30. See LeClair, supra note 20, at 14, 22.
31. See NAYLOR, supra note 3, at 166.

32. This is based
http://www.cihi.ca.

on

the

macro-spending

charts

provided

at
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legally be subject to co-insurance payments, deductibles or
extra billing for medically necessary services without the
federal government imposing a financial penalty on the
provincial health care system where the charge is applied.
The result is that there is no market for private insurers for
medically necessary services, although there is a significant
market for private firms to offer insurance for hospital
charges such as private rooms. At first glance, this unique
feature of the Canadian health care system might seem to
have its origins in a commitment to insulating health care
from considerations of 'ability to pay.' In fact, however, it
dates to the cost sharing formula between the federal and
provincial governments instituted in the 1957 Hospital
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act.
The Act put in place the first major cost sharing panCanadian social program, which became the exemplar for
the other national social programs developed in the 1960s
and 1970s that constitute Canada's welfare state. Much of
the focus of the hospital and diagnostic services cost
sharing mechanism has been on its formulation in terms of
the share of the costs the federal government would
assume. The federal government agreed to pay 25% of the
average per capita of costs in Canada as a whole plus 25%
of the average per capita of costs in an individual province
multiplied by the number of insured individuals in that
province. The effect of this formula was for the federal
government to pay a higher portion of actual costs in those
provinces with low per capita costs and a lower portion in
those with higher per capita costs. In 1957, the federal
government could thus anticipate paying only 45% of the
hospital and diagnostic services costs in British Columbia
while paying 71% of the costs in Newfoundland. 33 The
rationale for the formula was, of course, to provide
individual provinces with an incentive to lower their actual
costs and thereby increasing the federal government's
proportion. This formula was eventually replaced in 1977.
The more lasting feature of the cost sharing formula
was what it did not include in its calculation of the federal
government's share. Specifically, the federal government
excluded among the provincial spending on hospital and
diagnostic services it would match any payment made by an

33. See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 85-86.
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individual patient or on his or her behalf by a private
34
insurer. This idea was completely new in the 1957 Act.
The principal reason for excluding extra billing or coinsurance in its cost sharing formula on the part of the
federal government is completely transparent: the federal
government did not want to have to transfer matching
funds to provincial governments that included the matching
of payments by individual patients because it could then
face the possibility where the federal government was
paying half the costs of hospital and diagnostic services in a
province where the provincial government was contributing
almost nothing and individuals were contributing the other
half. In effect, the federal government wanted to ensure
that it was matching provincial government contributions
to hospital and diagnostic services.
The impact of this provision on provincial health care
systems is easy to anticipate. Provinces had a huge
incentive to seek alternatives to user fees and extra billing
for patients in hospitals. This is because the actual revenue
from such fees, once it was discounted by the absence of
matching federal funds, was only half of that collected. The
obvious alternative revenue sources for the provinces to pay
their share of hospital costs were general tax revenues,
provincial sales tax (which in some provinces was relabeled
a hospital sales tax), and a compulsory hospital insurance
premium. Different provinces used one or more of these
devices to match the federal contributions to hospital and
diagnostic services.
The evidence that no extra billing or user fees for
34. See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 84 n.6. The author observes that this
exclusion was not part of the federal government's proposals for national
hospital insurance in 1945. Aside from Taylor's brief footnote about this feature
of the Act, the innovative exclusion of extra billing or co-insurance in the 1957
Act from federal matching funds has received no academic commentary,
historical or contemporary, that I have found. The issue that did receive much
more attention at the time was that the Act provided public health insurance
for everyone rather than just targeting the poor and those who could not afford
paying private insurance premiums themselves. The hospital associations and
the physician associations in Canada at the time favored a program that
targeted the poor with the design of subsidizing individuals so that they could
pay the premiums of private insurance schemes. The government's rejection of
that the option was heavily influenced by studies at the time that showed the
immense administrative costs of such a targeted program and efficiency of a
program that provided for "uniform terms and conditions". See TAYLOR, supra
note 23, at 230.
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medically necessary hospital services constituted an
institutional settlement in Canada was clear by the time
that the Royal Commission on Health Services
recommended in 1964 that the cost-sharing model of
universal publicly funded health insurance be extended
from hospital and diagnostic services to physician services.
A foundational principle of that report was that the new
health care system be financed
through what it termed
"prepayment arrangements". 35 The commission defined
prepayment
arrangements
to
include
"premiums,
subsidized premiums, sales or other taxes, [and]
supplements from provincial general revenues. ' 36 The
significant point is that there was no allowance for patient
user fees or extra billing, for it was assumed that any
federal government matching formula would prohibit it.
Like any institutional settlement, over time it is
inevitable that what this particular institutional settlement
means will be renegotiated in response to other changes
and developments in the national health care system. Yet,
what makes it an institutional settlement is that any such
renegotiation will be constrained. In Canada, the reasons
for renegotiating the meaning of why there would be no
extra billing or user fees stemmed from the fiscal pressures
the federal government was under in the mid 1970s and its
efforts to limit its health care expenditures. Under the costsharing formula that had been in place since 1957, the
provinces simply presented the federal government with a
bill stating their overall expenditures and it was the federal
government's obligation to pay their share based on the
calculation for each province of 25% of the average per
capita of costs in Canada as a whole plus 25% of the
average per capita of costs in an individual province
multiplied by the number of insured individuals in that
province. Health care costs, especially in hospitals,
increased dramatically in the 1960s and the early 1970s.
The federal government sought a more predictable funding
formula. In 1977, with the agreement of the provinces, the
federal government shifted to a cost-sharing formula that
consisted of an annual block grant for each province

35. 1 ROYAL COMMISSION ON HEALTH SERVICES 11 (Emmett Hall, Chair

1964).
36. See id.
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determined at the outset of each fiscal year plus the
transfer of a certain percentage of federal income tax
revenue (tax points) to each province. The initial impact of
the new funding formula was that the federal government
paid more than half of the country's total public
expenditures on medical services but this share steadily
government pays
declined so that now the federal
37
approximately a third of those costs.
The new funding agreement was largely silent,
however, about user fees and extra billing. In the late
1970s, with provincial governments likewise feeling fiscal
pressures, a number of provinces began to entertain the
idea of introducing user fees and permitting extra billing by
physicians for medically necessary services. 38 Without the
matching funds scheme in place, the original main rationale
for that institutional settlement was no longer in place. In
1979, the federal government commissioned Emmett Hall,
who had originally chaired the 1964 Royal Commission on
Health Services and was then a judge on the Supreme
Court of Canada, to assess the issue of user fees and extra
billing. Hall, in his report Canada's National-Provincial
Health Programfor the 1980's: 'A Commitment for Renewal,'
reiterated that user fees and extra billing for medically
necessary physician and hospital services be prohibited but
offered a different principal rationale for this institutional
settlement. Hall argued there that the principal rationale
for prohibiting user fees and extra billing is that these
practices inhibit "reasonable access to services".3 9 Acting on
Hall's recommendations, the federal government enacted
the 1984 Canada Health Act, which articulated that federal
contributions to provincial health care plans were
conditional on those plans conforming to the five principles
of Medicare-and specified that federal transfers to an
individual provincial government may be reduced if it does

37. See THE HON. EMMETT M. HALL, CC., Q.C., SPECIAL COMMISSIONER,
CANADA'S NATIONAL-PROVINCIAL HEALTH PROGRAM FOR THE 1980'S 11-12

(Professor R. Gautier trans.) (1980). The precise percentage that the federal
government now contributes to public health care is politically contested and
requires careful elaboration, which is beyond the scope of the present paper.
38. These are well described by the federal Minister of Health and Welfare

at the time, Monique B6gin. See MONIQUE
HEALTH 1-21 (1987).

39. HALL, supra note 37, at 28-29.

BkGIN, MEDICARE: CANADA'S RIGHT TO
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not conform to the five principles and must be reduced if
user fees or extra billing are applied in exact proportion to
those fees or billings. 40 In practice, the federal government
has never reduced its transfer to a province because of noncompliance with the five principles of Medicare, but it has
41
reduced transfers in the case of user fees and extra billing.
It has become very evident in the past decade that the
political settlement excluding reliance on user fees and
extra billing for patients has considerably constrained the
options for conservative health care reformers. These
reformers have often proposed introducing user fees or
extra billing, only to find that the obstacles posed by that
institutional settlement are overwhelming. Indeed, an
important dimension of making sense of the initiatives by
conservative reformers has been to challenge the very idea
that there is continuity between the national health care
system established in the 1950s and 1960s and the health
care system enshrined in the 1984 Canada Health Act. The
distinguished Canadian historian Michael Bliss, for
example, writes "there have been two major experiments
with universal health insurance for Canadians: the plan
initiated by the Pearson government in the mid-1960s and
the Canada Health Act system put in place by the Trudeau
government in 1984."42 It is the second that in Bliss's view
is the problem. So he explains, "the ideological rigidity of
those who see the Canada Health Act as set in Canadian
stone has become a hindrance to health care reform and to
the country's capacity to adjust to the continuing challenges
of the modern world." 43 The analysis above shows, however,
that the institutional settlement against relying on user
40. Canada Health Act, R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 7 (1985) (Can.). The distinction in
the Canada Health Act between "may" and 'must" has puzzled recent
commentators. See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Bill 11, the CanadaHealth Act and the
Social Union: The Need for Institutions, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 39 (2000). Of
course, the upshot of the emphasis I am placing on the 1957 Hospital Insurance
and Diagnostic Services Act provides a clear rationale for the distinction
because the concern about user fees and extra billing dates to the perceived
unfairness of the federal government at the time having to match patient's
private contributions and not just the contributions of provincial governments.
41. See Choudry, supra note 40, at 38-39.
42. Michael Bliss, Health Care Without Hindrance: Medicare and the
CanadianIdentity, in BETTER MEDICINE: REFORMING CANADIAN HEALTH CARE 32

(David Gratzer, ed, 2002).,
43. Id. at 33.
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fees and extra billing was solid from 1957 to 1984. What
evolved was the principal rationale for that settlement, not
its essence or rigidity. There were not two settlements, only
one.
Significantly, under pressure from conservative health
care reformers, there is some evidence that the principal
rationale for the institutional settlement excluding user
fees and extra billing for medically necessary services is
evolving once again. Roy Romanow, Chair of the
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, in his
2002 report to the federal government, Building on Values:
the Future of Health Care in Canada, argues not simply
that user fees and extra billing for patients inhibit access
but also that it will make the health care system less
effective and undermine its broad mandate to make
Canadians healthier. 44 In effect, the point is that user fees
will not only discourage frivolous uses of the health care
system but also medically necessary ones. 45 This ongoing
effort to sustain the policy legacy of the 1957 Hospital
Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act demonstrates why
that first step towards a national publicly funded health
care system continues to bind health care reformers in
Canada today.
The most important effect this institutional settlement
has had on health care reform revolves around the way in
which it has cemented a stable constituency for public
health care in Canada. 46 Since there can be no extra billing
for medically necessary hospital and physician services
under federal legislation in Canada, this means that
affluent individual citizens do not have access to a separate
private health care system. The fact that there is this broad
stable constituency for publicly funded health care in
Canada means that everyone has a stake in preserving the
quality and comprehensiveness of the existing system and
44. Roy J. ROMANOW, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN
CANADA, BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 28
(2002).

45. Robert G. Evans, Financing Health Care. Options, Consequences, and
Objectives, in 1 THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA:
ROMANOW PAPERS 139, 166-72 (Gregory P. Marchildon et al. eds., 2004).
46. See Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare
State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,
98 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 243, 247 (2004).
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any reforms that threaten this will be politically infeasible
because of the high risk of electoral retribution. In effect, all
Canadians are in the same risk community and for this
to resist reform that
reason share a commitment
47
constitutes retrenchment.
POSITIVE FEEDBACK IN A HOSPITAL-CENTERED SYSTEM
I have above described how the institutional settlement
of excluding user fees and extra billing as a revenue source
for Medicare emerged in 1957, how it survived a major
challenge in the 1970s, and how it evolved over the past
fifty years. The cost-sharing approach the federal
government took in the 1957 Hospital and Diagnostic
Services Act impacted not simply how Medicare was
funded, it also shaped significantly how publicly funded
health care has been delivered in Canada. For nearly fifteen
years, until all of the provinces joined the federal
government's cost sharing program for physicians in 1971,
during which there was rapid expansion of Canada's health
care system, the federal government provided matching
funds only for hospital and diagnostic services. The 1957
Act excluded matching funds for psychiatric or mental
hospitals, laboratory and clinical services performed outside
of hospitals, and nursing homes for the aged among other
basic components of a mature health care system.
One of the most immediate consequences of having
universal public insurance only in hospitals was that there
was an incentive to expand the services provided by general
hospitals. In Ontario, for example, most large hospitals
added a psychiatric ward. Similarly, most Ontario
laboratory work was carried out in hospitals rather than in
private labs. For patients without insurance for physician
services, emergency wards in hospitals became a logical
first point of contact when health care concerns arose.
This expansion of services provided by general hospitals
was for the most part supported by provincial governments.
The reason was simple: the federal government had an
obligation to pay for half the cost of those services only

47. Susan Giaimo has made this point in general about universal health
care systems. See Susan Giaimo, Who Pays for Health Care Reform?, in THE
NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 340, 341 (Paul Pierson ed., 2001).
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when they were provided by hospitals. In the language of
the 1960s, the provincial governments were spending fifty
cent dollars. This sort of spending structure during the
1960s created a hospital-centered publicly funded health
care system. Hospitals are still by far the biggest
expenditure in Canada's health care system.
One short-term effect of this expansion of services
provided by hospitals was that it greatly increased
48
unnecessarily the actual cost to the federal government.
Moreover, it meant that there were many services being
provided in high cost general hospitals that could have been
provided more cheaply elsewhere. This point about
increased cost of the program should not be confused with
the issue that received a great deal of attention among
American researchers at the time. Their question was
whether providing patients with free hospitalization would
result in a dramatic increase in hospitalization, in effect
causing a rush to hospitals. The evidence showed, however,
that this did not happen in Canada following the 1957
Hospital and Diagnostic Services Act. 49 In other words, a
universal publicly funded hospital insurance system did not
lead to increased utilization of existing patient services.
The fact that the publicly funded health care system in
Canada was initially so hospital-centered continues to
constrain health care reform today because of its positive
feedback effects that reinforce the status quo. Recall that
positive feedback occurs when an existing state of affairs is
self-reinforcing in the sense that it is difficult or costly to
change the status quo and switch to another state of affairs.
Two very important and related factors need to be
highlighted. The first factor is that the workforce of
hospitals increased dramatically after 1957. This increase
did not reflect a dramatic increase in demand for patient
care for traditional hospital services-there is no evidence of
such an increase-but rather the expansion of services and
resources hospitals offered. The second factor is that
hospital workplaces became a major site for unionization.
At present, every hospital in Canada has a unionized
workforce of allied support workers and nurses. The initial
reason for high rates of unionization in hospitals was
48. See TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 235.

49. See EvANS, supra note 22, at 160-64; TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 234.
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transparent: "government-assured financial support for
hospitals ... [created] pressures for wage and benefit parity
with the private sector." 50 Indeed, the overwhelming
evidence is that the dramatic upward spiraling of hospital
costs in the 1960s is best explained by the increased
earnings of (previously underpaid) hospital workers. 51 The
long term effect is, however, a large unionized workforce
centered in hospitals.
These two factors bring to the forefront the positive
feedback effect of Canada having developed a hospitalcentered publicly funded health care system. In 2003, there
were 537,000 people employed in Canadian hospitals,
approximately one-third of them in Ontario. 52 Although this
total had declined 6.3% from 1991, this still amounts to one
of the largest concentrations of unionized workers in the
country. 53 The total workforce in Canada in 2004 amounted
to 15.7 million people. 54 Thus, one in thirty work in
hospitals. The result is that when proposals for health care
reform affect hospitals, there is immense pressure to
consider the implications for such a large portion of the
Canadian workforce. In particular, concerns about job and
income security for these workers becomes one of the
biggest factors to consider in any feasible reform to the
health care system. Not surprisingly, in recent years there
have been a series of influential studies, often supported by
union research funds, focused on how health care reforms
affect the working conditions and long term employment
prospects of hospital workers. 55 Moreover, there is now

50. LeClair, supranote 20, at 63.
51. Robert Evans, Beyond the Medical Marketplace: Expenditure, Utilization
and Pricingof Insured Health in Canada,in HEALTH INSURANCE: CAN WE LEARN
FROM CANADA?, supra note 20, at 151.

52. Statistics Canada, Employees in Health Care and Social Assistance, at
http://www.statscan.ca/english/freepub/71-222-XIE/2004000/chart-e31.htm (last
modified Nov. 17, 2004).
53. KENT V. RONDEAU & TERRY H. WAGAR, WORKFORCE REDUCTION PRACTICES
IN CANADIAN HOSPITALS 1 (1998), available at http://www.industrialrelations
centre.com/infobank/currentissues-series/workforcereduction-practices-in-ca
nadian-hospitals.pdf.
54. Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey, at http://www.statcan.ca/
englishlSubjects/Labour/LFS/lfs-en.htm (last modified Mar. 6, 2005).
55. See, e.g., PAT ARMSTRONG & HUGH ARMSTRONG, WASTING AWAY: THE
UNDERMINING OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE, (2d ed. 2003); PAT ARMSTRONG ET AL.
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recognition that the complex issues of human resources are
integral to effecting change in Canada's health care
system.56
The limitations this sets on health care reform are
evident in Ontario over the past year. On June 7, 2004, the
Ontario Legislature enacted Bill 8, The Commitment to the
Future of Medicare Act. This Act included provisions
designed to make hospitals more accountable for their
spending and prohibited them from running annual
operating deficits. The practice in the province has been for
most hospitals to run deficits, which at the year's end, the
province would provide additional funding to cover. The
provincial government's objective was to stabilize its
funding by ending this practice. The Act also anticipated
the shifting of services provided in hospitals to more
community-based provision. As the provincial government
prepared for its 2005 Ontario Budget, which would
implement the main provisions of Bill 8, the Ontario
Hospital Association, which represents all of the hospitals
in the province, presented to the legislature in January
2005 its recommendations for the new budget. The main
force of the presentation was precisely to highlight the job
losses that would result from the implementation of Bill 8's
provisions - 2000 jobs this year, 8700 next year, and more
to come the year after. 57 In order to avoid these huge
layoffs, the Ontario Hospital Association recommended that
the province provide "transitional funding" and increase the
individual budgets of hospitals. 58 Of course, if the province
were to follow these two recommendations, much of its

"HEAL THYSELF": MANAGING HEALTH CARE REFORM (2000).
56. See, e.g., PAT ARMSTRONG & HUGH ARMSTRONG, Planning for Care:
Approaches to Human Resources Policy and Planning in Health Care, in 2
CHANGING HEALTH CARE IN CANADA: ROMANOW PAPERS 117 (Pierre-Gerlier Forest

et al. eds., 2004); Gail Tomblin Murphy & Linda O'Brien-Pallas, How Do
Human Resource Policies and PracticesInhibit Change in Health Care? A Plan
for the Future, in 2 CHANGING HEALTH CARE IN CANADA: ROMANOw PAPERS 150

(Pierre-Gerlier Forest et al. eds., 2004).
57. Ontario Hospital Association, Presentation to the Standing Committee
on Finance and Economic Affairs, Legislative Assembly of Ontario,
http://www.oha.com/client/OHA/OHALP4WLNDWebStation.nsf/page/Presen
tation+to+the+Standing+Committee+on+Finance+and+Economic+Affairs
(last
visited May 22, 2005).
58. See id.
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anticipated benefit of undertaking the reforms would be
lost.
The sheer size of the hospital sector as a proportion of
the health care system and its resources also contribute to
the positive feedback effect. The Ontario Hospital
Association and the unions have the funds to spend on
elaborate public relations campaigns designed to sway
public opinion. Moreover, both can afford political lobbyists
to directly access legislators and civil servants in the
Ministry of Health. In these two respects, these
organizations are quite unique in making their voices heard
in debates about health care reform in Ontario. As I already
indicated above, they also are able to fund research that
investigates the negative impact of various health care
reform options and, in this way, put pressure on those
proposing a reform agenda to concede that deviations from
the status quo will have costs.
HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE FACE OF POLICY LEGACIES AND
PATH DEPENDENCY

Above, I have argued that the fact that hospitals were
the first site of universal publicly funded insurance in the
1950s has left a policy legacy that still impacts the
prospects for health care reform today. In particular, I have
shown how the institutional settlement against extra
billing and the positive feedback dynamics of a hospitalcentered health care system constrain the path for reform.
Ultimately, at the centre of the analysis of Canadian health
care policy offered here is an image of health care policy as
a moving picture or film as opposed to a snap shot. 59 The
predominant approach among policy analysts is to offer a
single snap shot of the Canadian health care system, in
effect, describing the health care system at some specific
point in time. This sort of snapshot approach is the one that
has most influenced the health care reform agenda. Yet, it
is problematic precisely because it fails to capture how
policy legacies actually work (e.g., through institutional
settlements and positive feedback mechanisms) and
59. This metaphor is borrowed from Paul Pierson, Not Just What, But When:
Timing and Sequence in PoliticalProcesses, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72 (2000).
See also Kathleen Thelen, Timing and Temporality in the Analysis of
InstitutionalEvolution and Change, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 101 (2000).
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therefore limits the vision of those who seek effective health
care reform. Instead, by not accommodating for the policy
legacies and path dependency in the development of
Canada's health care system, the health care reform agenda
is characterized by a recurring pattern of failed efforts to
build new institutions.
Institutional
settlements and positive feedback
mechanisms suggest two strategies for pursuing the health
care reform agenda without necessarily building brand new
institutions. One strategy is that of internal conversion.
Internal conversion involves altering the aims or operations
of an existing institution without altering its formal
structure. 60 Institutional settlements in health care policy
such as the exclusion of extra billing and user fees for
medically necessary hospital and physician services are
especially susceptible to conversion. One way to view the
recommendations of the Hall commission in 1980 and
subsequent adoption of those recommendations by the
Trudeau administration in its enactment of the 1984
Canada Health Act is in terms of internal conversion.
Leaving intact the idea that the federal government's
contribution would be reduced if user fees or extra billing
occurred for medically necessary services, the rationale was
converted from one about the fairness of the provincial
government not matching the federal government's share to
one about user fees and extra billing constituting a barrier
to access for patients.
"The notion of conversion," observes Thelen, "provides
an analytic point of departure for understanding how
institutions created for one set of purposes come, in time, to
be turned to whole new ends. '61 Yet, conversion can also
have its pitfalls. In its 2004 provincial budget, the newly
elected Liberal Government in Ontario introduced what it
called a Ontario Health Premium. This premium was to
range from $300 to $900 for each working adult, depending
on his or her income. During the election, the party had
promised not to raise taxes, so by calling it a premium, it
appeared more like a payment for health insurance than a
new tax. By invoking the language of premiums, the
government was attempting to convert an earlier

60. See Hacker, supranote 46, at 258.
61. THELEN, supra note 14, at 36.
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institution-Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP)
premiums had existed for twenty years in Ontario before
they were abolished in 1987, although Alberta and British
Columbia continue to have premiums-into a new revenue
source for the provincial government. The Ontario Health
Premium is designed to be paid for by individuals; the
government did not want to impose a new sort payroll tax
on employers. Yet, precisely because it sought to convert the
institution of OHIP premiums, the government's new
scheme has been subverted by that legacy. In the 1970s and
1980s, many unions negotiated collective agreements with
employers that provided for the employer to pay the OHIP
premiums for individuals and their families. Collective
bargaining since then often did not strip this benefit from
the collective agreement after the premiums were abolished
in 1987. This has raised the possibility that some employers
will be required to pay the new Ontario Health Premium
for its employees under the conditions of their collective
agreement that has the employer paying the OHIP
premium. Two very different conclusions have been reached
in the three unreported labor arbitration cases where this
situation has arisen. 62 In two cases, the arbitrator ruled
that the employer was not required to pay the new Ontario
Health Premium, even though the collective agreement had
not been stripped of the earlier condition that the employer
pay the OHIP premium. In the other, the arbitrator ruled
that the employer was bound to pay the new Ontario
Health Premium.
layering.
institutional
is
strategy
The other
Institutional layering involves developing new institutions
and policies without the elimination of older or established
institutions. 63 Layering occurs to the extent that these new
institutions and policies are layered on top of the existing
institutions and in a sense operate in a complementary

62. See Guy Giorno, Who Pays Ontario Health Premium Tax? Dispute
Escalates, Fasken Marineau Alert (Fasken Marineau) Nov. 2004, at 1
(discussing the following three cases: Coll. Comp. and Appointments Council v.
O.P.S.E.U. (Oct. 29, 2004) (Shime, Arb.); Lapointe Fisher Nursing Home v.
U.F.C.W. Local 175/633 (Oct. 6, 2004) (Barrett, Arb.); Jazz Air Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n Int'l (Sept. 27, 2004) (Teplitsky, Arb.)), available at
http://www.fasken.com/web/fmdwebsite.nsf/0/2759253F3B1B30A585256F3C004
68294?OpenDocument.
63. See Hacker, supra note 46, at 248-49; THELEN, supra note 14, at 35-36.
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fashion. Although institutional layering entails reform of
formal health care policy, it is noteworthy because it adds
complexity to the health care system, whereas reforms that
replace or eliminate existing institutions with new ones are
a type of simplification. One metaphorical way to think
about institutional layering is in terms of an organism:
layering involves grafting on another appendage. The
effects of layering are significant because in a complex
system such as Canada's health care system, there are
likely to be unintended and unanticipated consequences
in
because other institutions adapt to the layering, which
64
turn can lead to major changes in a non-linear fashion.
Institutional layering in health care can take different
forms. One form is to add institutions that are explicitly
involved in the delivery of health care. An example might
be the establishing of convenient neighborhood after-hours
drop-in clinics for families with children. These clinics
obviously would reduce the demands on more expensive
hospital emergency departments. But they might also
impact primary care in the sense that they expose patients
to units that provide primary care in a forum other than the
familiar single physician practice. The establishment of
these clinics constitutes a form of layering because it does
not involve eliminating or closing hospital emergency
departments, nor does it involve pressuring family
physicians to join larger clinic-style practices. Another
example of primary care reform might be to introduce
financial incentives, similar to those that currently exist for
those willing to practice in remote northern areas, for new
physicians or students still in medical school to join larger
clinic style practices rather than to open or buy a more
traditional family practice.
Another form of institutional layering could graph on
institutions that reflect the significant amount of recent65
research showing the social determinants of health.
Government programs that focus on early childhood
64. See in particular Sholom Glouberman & Brenda Zimmerman,
Complicated and Complex Systems: What Would Successful Reform of Medicare
Look Like?, in 2 CHANGING HEALTH CARE IN CANADA: ROMANOw PAPERS 22

(Pierre-Gerlier Forest et al. eds., 2004).
65. See, e.g., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (Michael Marmot & Richard
G. Wilkinson eds., 1999); SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES (Dennis Raphael ed., 2004).
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development are a good example. There are indicators that
the expansion of these kinds of programs in France has
been a major factor in any explanation for France's
successful health care reform in the past decade. 66 These
programs constitute a form of institutional layering
precisely because they do not replace or eliminate the
traditional focus of Canada's publicly funded health care
system on hospitals and physician services. Indeed,
institutional layering in a mature health care system
makes sense precisely because of the complex determinants
of good health.

66. See SocIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, supra note 65, at 37.

